Information systems offshore outsourcing is motivated by such factors as globalization, technological development and the possibility to explore new markets. However, both the geographical and the cultural distance create more risks than in onshore outsourcing. The aim of this article is to develop a typology of firms based on the specific motivations and risks associated with offshore outsourcing in large Spanish firms.
Organizational and business models have recently undergone radical changes due to the trend toward globalisation and to the disintegration of enterprise value chains linked to providers and/or customers. A vast number of technological developments (Clott, 2007) have compounded the changes. One result of these changes has been the outsourcing of Information Systems (IS), not only nationally (onshore outsourcing) but also internationally (offshore outsourcing) (Kumar, 2006) . Indeed, while outsourcing information technologies (IT) represents a growing worldwide phenomenon in the new millennium, the growth of offshore outsourcing has been particularly remarkable (Koong, Liu, & Wang, 2007) . For instance, the IT market moved over 185 billion € around the world in 2005 (IDATE Foundation, 2005) . Forrester estimates that the world's IT and applications outsourcing market is now worth around $120 billion per year (Takahashi & Sayer, 2007) and forecasts that European firms will increase their IT outsourcing expenditure in 2008. The Gartner Group expects the global IT outsourcing market to grow from $180.5 billion in revenues in 2003 to $253.1 billion in 2008 (Forrester, 2004) . Eighty-seven percent of the companies interviewed by KPMG plan to maintain or increase their outsourcing levels (ZDNet, 2007) and International Data Corporation has forecast that IT service dealers will make $29.4 billion USD worldwide by 2010, with few visible signs of potential decline in this market (ZDNet, 2006) . Although the numerical predictions vary from one source to another, the favourable prospects and expectations for growth in the coming years are undeniable.
IT offshore outsourcing brings problems similar to those associated with onshore or national outsourcing (Harland, Knight, Lamming and, & Walker, 2005; Paisittanand & Olson, 2006; Yang, Kim, Nam, & Min, 2007) and is attractive for similar reasons. It also has comparable potential risks (Lin, Pervan, & McDermid, 2007; Taylor, 2006 Taylor, , 2007 Osei-Bryson & Ngwenyama, 2006) . IS offshore outsourcing, however, has a number of challenges, which are specific to it and differ from those found in onshore outsourcing. Firms must contend with differences in languages, culture, and time zones. Offshore efforts are likely to require more changes within the IS organisation than domestic outsourcing. Offshoring involves such risks as loss of core knowledge and vendor opportunism, data security, privacy problems and complying with foreign laws and regulations. Problems such as possible layoffs and loss of human capital are more likely with offshore outsourcing than with onshore outsourcing (Carmel, 2006; Oshri, Kotlarsky, & Willcocks, 2007; Ranganathan & Balaji, 2007; Rottman & Lacity, 2004) .
Studies examining the risks in offshore outsourcing are numerous (i.e., Apte et al, 1997; Khan et al, 2003; Kliem, 2004; Ramarapu, Parzinger, & Lado, 1997) . We have taken a more holistic perspective by looking simultaneously at the perceptions of motivation and risk, which is somewhat unusual.
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This article seeks to understand the motivations and risks in offshore outsourcing by conducting an exploratory field survey in the largest Spanish firms and establishing a typology of firms involved in offshore outsourcing. We first examine the position of Spanish firms in connection with onshore as well as offshore outsourcing. We then describe determining factors for offshore outsourcing with a special focus on the motivations and the risks linked to it. Next, we present our methodology along with results and conclusions. Several theories have been put forth in the past 15 years to explain IS outsourcing, both offshore and onshore, including outsourcing motivations and risks. We examine offshore outsourcing motivations and risks which are related with factors like costs, technology and infrastructure, time, quality, and also international and employment factors (see Appendix A- Table 1 ).
The 'Cost Saving' Motivation
According to the transaction cost theory, (Williamson, 1975 (Williamson, , 1979 , we must consider two main costs in the production of goods or services: production costs (work, capital and materials); and coordination costs (derived from managing and controlling employees). If the firm goes to the market instead of performing all activities in-house, coordination costs turn into transaction costs, which arise from the need to negotiate, monitor and enforce contracts and coordinate activities beyond the borders of the organisation (Wang, 2002) . This theory suggests that offshore outsourcing is more efficient than performing IS activities in-house or than onshore outsourcing when production costs are lower. Firms are attracted to offshore providers by economies of scale, which can benefit the customer through lower prices (Apte et al, 1997; Grover, Cheon, & Teng, 1994) . But the biggest attraction of offshore outsourcing is the difference in salary between staff in the home country and in the provider country (Ravichandran & Ahmed, 1993) .
The 'Hidden Costs' Risk
In contrast with these savings, the hidden costs of offshore outsourcing may be higher than those of IS outsourcing in general (Barthélemy, 2001) . These hidden costs can be explained by the agency theory, which sees the firm as a link in contracts between principals and agents. This theory assumes the existence of asymmetric information and different perceptions of risk between principal and agent, as well as uncertainty (Dibbern et al., 2004) ; the principal transfers decision rights to the agent and, to make sure that the latter behaves in the former's best interest, the principal sets incentives. The anticipated costs of controlling the agent come into play when calculating the nature of these incentives. Cheon, Grover, and Teng (1995) maintain that agency costs depend on five factors -outcome uncertainty, risk aversion, programmability, outcome measurability, and length of the relationship-two of which are related to the hidden cost risk. The 'uncertainty' is due to government policies, the economic climate, technological change, competitors' actions, and so on. 'Programmability' refers to how much one can specify appropriate behaviour of the outsourcing provider in advance. The hidden costs risk is linked to uncertainty and programmability since, when these risks appear, agency costs become higher. We should also consider the importance of the transaction cost theory to explain these hidden costs. This theory posits that the critical dimensions of a transaction are the specificity of the asset that is the object of transaction; the frequency with which this transaction takes place; and the uncertainty associated with this transaction. From this third characteristic derives the uncertainty and/or lack of knowledge about the provider, another factor for hidden costs. Hidden costs include (Barthélemy, 2001 ) the coordination costs the firms must incur while getting to know the providers, as well as their labour legislation and culture; the costs of the transfer of know-how from customer to provider; the costs resulting from the adoption of opportunistic behaviour by the provider which can increase with distance; and even the costs of uncertainty about fluctuations in currency exchange rates (Kliem, 2004; Khan et al., 2003) .
The 'Technical Feasibility' Motivation Loh and Venkatraman (1992) and Hu, Saunders, and Gebelt (1997) characterise IS outsourcing as an administrative innovation which can apply to IS offshore outsourcing. This approach starts from the implicit assumption that decisions related to outsourcing, whether onshore or offshore, have to do with the influence that outside agents have on the decisionmakers within the organisation. Thus, the more widespread the offshore outsourcing practice is and the more information about this type of strategy, the greater the likelihood of adopting this decision. Both the academic and the economic press have acted as external agents in these decisions, repeatedly highlighting the technical feasibility of offshore outsourcing, from which the "technical feasibility" motivation stems. This advantage has already appeared as a factor driving offshore outsourcing, since telecommunications, and above all the Internet, make possible a rapid connection with practically every corner of the planet (Menon, 2005; Misra, 2004) .
The 'Poor Infrastructure' Risk
Transaction cost theory shows us that transaction cost depends on the specificity of the assets, the frequency of the transactions and the uncertainty of the transaction (Williamson, 1975 (Williamson, , 1979 . The uncertainty due to the lack of knowledge about the infrastructure of the offshore firm makes us realize that despite the previous advantage, many developing countries, which are frequently the main outsourcing destinations, have inadequate telecommunications infrastructures and even lack more basic infrastructures such as the electricity supply (Carmel, 2003) .
The 'Flexibility and Speed' Motivation
Relational exchange theory focuses on cooperation, interaction, and social and economic exchange as major factors in relationships among organisations, and more specifically on interactions among parties that join together to accomplish their objectives (Klepper, 1995) . The partners assume that the benefits of the outcome exceed those they could achieve on their own. This theory is the basis for the "flexibility and speed motivation," which arise from the joint action of client and provider in the offshore relationship thanks to their complementary time and resources. Quickness has become a priority for the IT industry. For instance, externalising part of the systems development process means that executing a project can take place 24 hours a day because, at least in theory, when the working day begins in some time zones, it ends in others -this is the 'managing around the clock' effect - (Khan et al., 2003; Pfannenstein & Tsai, 2004) . (Williamson, 1975 (Williamson, , 1979 Transaction costs include those arising from coordinating activities across the borders of the organisation (Wang, 2002) . The coordination between client and provider can become problematic due to different time zones, which may hinder client-provider communication in real time. The motivation to offshore outsource might become a problem if one considers how difficult it is for the customer and the provider of offshoring services to coordinate their operations (Carmel, 2006) . Although this might seem a minor drawback, it is not. Many firms look for providers in nearby time zones because it allows the members of a 'distributed team' to work in the same time zone (Apte et al, 1997; Rao, 2004) .
The 'Different Time Zones' Risk

The 'Improved Quality' Motivation
Resource-based theory views a firm as a collection of productive resources (those inputs that enable it to perform a particular task) and capacities (those abilities and skills the firm needs to coordinate and exploit the resources to meet an objective) (Watjatrakul, 2005) . From this theoretical point of view, we can see offshore outsourcing as a mechanism that fills the gaps between a firm's own resources and capabilities and the resources and capabilities that the firm needs. Cheon, Grover, and Teng (1995) argue that IS outsourcing is a strategic decision that can help bridge the gaps (the difference between the desired resources and capabilities and the actual ones) in the IS resources and capabilities of firms. The authors use the example of information quality and staff quality to explain several of the resources or capabilities that result from outsourcing. The same holds true for offshore outsourcing because it covers shortages of internal resources and capabilities and/or onshore resources and capabilities. In conclusion, this theory allows us to identify the "improved quality" motivation, where the customer's outcome goals for outsourcing evolve. Initially, cost reduction was the prime goal, but buyers' expectations are moving beyond low-cost solutions (Chitale, 2006) . Firms currently adopt offshore outsourcing in the hope that it will improve their business results. This means that outsourcing no longer constitutes a tactical solution of a technical nature but a strategic solution that creates and defends the firm's competitive advantage (Erber & Sayed-Ahmed, 2005; Pai & Basu, 2007) . We should take into account access to high levels of expertise (Mahnke, Wareham, & Bjorn-Andersen, 2008 ) and the positive impact on IS service quality.
The 'Deficient Quality' Risk
One of the biggest risks in offshore outsourcing is when the services delivered do not reach the quality level required. This happens if the provider's staff has not received enough training and does not know the customer's language well enough, which may hinder customer-provider communication. Problems may also arise from lack of knowledge about managerial tasks as well as project management and implementation skills, which has occurred with some offshore providers (Zatolyuk & Allgood, 2004) . Transaction cost theory can explain these risks, as the uncertainty related to transaction costs can imply a lack of knowledge about the quality of the provider's services. Agency theory also explains these risks. Cheon, Grover, and Teng (1995) argue that agency costs relate to five factors, two of which are uncertainty and programmability. In conditions of high uncertainty and low programmability (typical in many offshore contracts), the "deficient quality" risk may arise.
The 'Access to International Markets' Motivation
Strategic management theories, including the competitive strategy theory and the competitive advantage theory, have been often used to explain how IT can contribute to competitive advantage (Porter & Millar, 1985) . These theories state that firms have long-term goals and thus plan and allocate resources to achieve these goals. Porter and Millar (1985) explain that we must observe the added value chain and ask how IT can change the scope of competence. One of the questions they address specifically is whether these technologies allow expanding the business internationally. A similar discussion has emerged in the offshore outsourcing area, as some firms adopt offshore outsourcing because of access to international markets." For many companies, offshore outsourcing represents a way not only to find providers, but also to acquire a better knowledge of other countries and explore their potential as future markets (Ravichandran & Ahmed, 1993; Sobol & Apte, 1995) . This is relevant considering that many countries providing offshore IT services, such as China or Russia, have an enormous potential due to their large populations and their economic growth expectations (Rottman & Lacity, 2006) .
Risks related to Language, Cultural, Political, and Legal Problems
Offshore outsourcing faces many difficulties linked to culture, language, politics, and law. Hofstede's study on National Cultures (1991, 2001) , now a key part of research on global work and international business relationships 2008) , says there is no universal management method equally applicable to all countries. It is impossible to separate management from other processes that exist in each society. Managers in charge of offshore projects must be able to incorporate cultural variations from different nations. The concept of national cultures and their implications for management helps to explain the "cultural problems" risk, as the lack of cultural congruence between customer and provider may generate communication problems, especially when a language barrier exists (Kim, Meso, & Kim, 2005) . Culture has effects on the way managers interact with their employees, how they perceive the importance of authority or teamwork, and how they respond to gender issues or quality of life issues (Krishna, Sashay, & Walsham, 2004; Mahnke, Wareham, & Bjorn-Andersen, 2008; Rao, 2004) . Risk occurs also when political instability or poor relations exist between the customer's country and the provider's (Hemphill, 2004) . Legal factors can also influence the outsourcing relationship, including (Pai & Basu, 2007) the legislation that will govern the outsourcing contract; solving problems related to software use licenses and permits; analysing legislation on data protection; adhering to laws on intellectual property; and understanding the negative effects that local laws can have on the outsourcing relationship. Some countries competing for leadership in offshore outsourcing, for example, have no guarantees for intellectual property and other basic protections (Menon, 2005; Oshri, Kotlarsky, & Willcocks, 2007; Ranganathan & Balaji, 2007; Rottman & Lacity, 2006) . Political and legal problems in foreign countries are connected to uncertainty about transaction costs and agency costs, so transaction cost theory and agency theory may help to explain these risks.
The 'Improved Cost/Benefit Ratio' Motivation
The resource-based theory sees offshore outsourcing as a way to fill the gaps between the firm's resources and capabilities and the resources and capabilities it needs. Cheon, Grover, and Teng (1995) said that cost effectiveness could be one of the targets of IS outsourcing. The potential cost effectiveness implies an increased level of efficiency by the offshore outsourcing customer firm and, consequently, an improved cost/ benefit ratio. This advantage not only affects offshore outsourcing customers directly but also has broader consequences because, in theory, customers outsource to the most efficient provider, which makes the IT service more efficient at the same time (Misra, 2004) .
The 'Increased Unemployment Rate' Risk
In a media-driven society like ours, concern about the reputation effects of firms' behaviours and corporate social responsibility become more important in all the organisation' actions (Midttun et al, 2007) . Corporate social responsibility refers to activities aimed at providing social contributions that ultimately yield economic returns to investors (Doh, 2005) . This view of corporate social responsibility reveals a new problem in offshore outsourcing the "increased unemployment rate" risk. Bruce and Martz (2007) noted that IT employees are potentially affected by offshore outsourcing, and event students (future employees) could be affected as their job opportunities could be impacted by offshoring. This could have serious consequences, but the focus of this article is the effect of this risk on the morale, productivity, and behaviour of the offshore client's staff. Offshore outsourcing implies greater risks for the IT workers of developed countries (the customers) than onshore outsourcing. National (onshore) outsourcing often involves the transfer of workers from the customer firm to the service provider, and as a result, the staff may benefit from improved career opportunities. Nevertheless, offshore outsourcing may cause problems ranging from occupational stress (Brooks, 2006) to labour hazards and possible salary reductions (Shao & David, 2007) . Hence, the great concern among associations of IT professionals about the negative effects of offshore outsourcing (Brigham, 2005; Hirschheim, 2006; IEEE, 2004; Pfannenstein & Tsai, 2004) justifies why both governments and firms, and even workers, have to take measures to minimise those harmful impacts (Gupta & Chaudhari, 2006) . Despite the frequent mention of this risk in articles, there are no conclusive data supporting it (Rottman & Lacity, 2004) and, according to the ILO (OIT, 2005) , the proportion of the unemployment figures that one can directly attribute to offshore outsourcing is not especially high.
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METHODOLOGY
Based on the assumption that larger-sized firms are the most likely to outsource (Lee, Miranda, & Kim, 2004) , we distributed a questionnaire to the largest Spanish enterprises. The '5,000 Largest Firms' Directory of the Actualidad Económica magazine-later collated with other databases such as Duns and Bradstreet's 'The 50,000 Most Important Spanish Firms'-established the target population for the study. We removed 893 of the 5,000 firms with higher turnovers included in the first database because their address and telephone coincided with those of others, which suggested that they were subsidiary or affiliate companies.
The remaining 4,107 firms received questionnaires along with a stamped self-addressed envelope. The questionnaire derives from a previous one prepared by the same authors and constructed, like this one, from the literature on the topic as a reference. Additionally, some experts in IS management analysed the questionnaire. 3 We included only eight of the 26 questions in the final questionnaire in the present article, as this is part of a larger study which deals with a wide range of issues related to IS outsourcing (see Appendix B). Of those eight questions, one pertains to the extent of outsourcing, both nationally or globally; five pertain to the general profile of the firms in the study as well as their IS departments and managers; and two questions deal with offshore outsourcing motivations and risks. Table 2 shows the measurements for the main variables analysed in the study.
The questionnaire addressee was the IS manager of the selected firms. Unfortunately, no lists of these managers are available in Spain, leaving the identity of the questionnaire addressee unknown. We later elaborated upon the questionnaire using the statistical program SPSS for Windows, and treated it with univariate and multivariate methods. Table 3 shows the technical specifications of the empirical work.
Three-hundred twenty-nine valid questionnaires were received, which represents an 8% response rate. This ratio may seem low, but it is actually similar or even superior to others in comparable studies of IT outsourcing (Bahli & Rivard, 2005; Ma, Pearson, & Tadisina, 2005; Shi, Kunnathur, & Ragu-Nathan, 2005) . It is also difficult to obtain responses to surveys carried out among executives, especially IS executives, because rapid technological change, considerable IT-related investments by firms and the great interest in outsourcing have made these executives the target of many surveys (Poppo & Zenger, 1998) . The firms that answered the questionnaire reflect the total population in terms of size (sales and number of employees) and sector. A T-test verified the possible differences in the number-of-employees mean both for firms that answered the survey and for those that did not, with T having a value of -1.080 with a 0.280 significance level. In the case of sales, we used a non-parametric test-Mann-Whitney's U-test⎯ with a value of 444732.5 and a 0.338 significance level. A Chi-square test helped to check the possible connection between the industrial sector and the response or lack of response by firms. The Chi value was 2.802 and the significance level 0.246. These results imply the existence of a non-response bias in relation to these three variables. 4 Because as discussed in the next section, most of the interviewed firms did not use offshore outsourcing, the number of answers about offshore outsourcing motivations and risks was low. One-hundred seventy-seven firms answered these Table 4 shows the general features of the interviewed firms and of their IS departments and managers. We identified possible differences between firms which practice offshore outsourcing and those that do not. The study confirms that IT outsourcing has become a widespread phenomenon on a national scale, as 83.6% of the interviewed firms outsource some of their IS activities to a national provider, and only 54 firms (16.4%) do not. Global outsourcing continues to be an isolated phenomenon in Spain, though, since only 54 of the firms analysed (16.4%) look for IS providers abroad. A significant dependence relationship exists with respect to whether firms outsource inside or outside their country (the chi-square statistic detects dependence between both variables with a 0.000 significance level). Only one firm uses international outsourcing without national outsourcing. The rest of the firms that use offshore outsourcing have national providers too.
RESULTS
General Characteristics of Firms and Offshore Outsourcing
Going back to Table 4 on the general characteristics of the firm and its activity sector, the firms analysed have considerable size. Only 8.7% of the firms have fewer than 50 workers and only 9.6% have an annual turnover below 30 million euros, most of the firms being at higher levels in terms of both employee numbers and sales. Just over half of the firms belong to the industrial sector (57.4%), while the rest are either in the general service sector service (31%) or in ICT-intensive service sectors (e.g., financial and insurance institutions, along with enterprises in the tourist, legal and publishing sectors, for example). The latter group (11.6% of the sample) includes firms that depend more than the rest on their ICT, due to the type of products/goods/services they offer and its elaboration process. The only dependence relationship between the general features of the firm and its adoption or non-adoption of offshore outsourcing appears in the case of sales. Indeed, firms with higher sales show a greater tendency to offshore outsourcing. Despite the size of these firms, their IS departments are small: the majority of firms (77.6%) have 10 or fewer employees in this department. Neither do they allocate a large proportion of the budget to it, as many organisations (66.7%) dedicate only 4% of their overall budget, or even less, to IS. Although these firms are relatively large, they allocate few financial and human resources to their IS departments. No dependence relationship between the characteristics of the IS department and the adoption or non-adoption of offshore outsourcing by the firm is apparent either.
The IS manager is almost always male (91.6% of the cases). Most of the interviewees report directly to general management (62.6%), while reporting to finance/administration is less common (26.5%). Interestingly, when a woman heads the IS department (as measured with the chi-square statistic), the firm is more likely to use offshore outsourcing. Table 5 shows the motivations to adopt offshore outsourcing by decreasing order of importance. It is evident that technical feasibility heads the list of reasons to outsource offshore, i.e., the fact that the technology is available to establish international connections and achieve fluent communications between provider and customer has encouraged the latter to look for foreign providers. Firms equally seek efficiency through improving the cost/benefit ratio in these offshore outsourcing contracts, and the fact that flexibility and speed in IT projects can improve is another important factor. However, firms are not convinced that international services will mean more quality, and they assign little importance to whether outsourcing may become a way to access foreign markets. Neither are reduced costs the main reason for offshore outsourcing. Table 6 shows the risks of offshore outsourcing by decreasing order of importance, according to the interviewees' perceptions. Language, cultural, political, and legal problems head the list, the rest of the risks lagging far behind. The different time zones associated with physical distance are a serious problem in the interviewees' opinion, despite asynchronous means of communication that could solve these difficulties. The fear of incurring greater costs than in onshore outsourcing is also a relevant factor. This physical and cultural distance reflects a certain degree of opportunism on the part of the service provider. Other problems, such as the quality of the provider or poor infrastructures are considered less important. In fact, technical feasibility is among the most significant motivations, and problems related to infrastructures or technology do not represent insurmountable barriers for offshore outsourcing. Finally, the macroeconomic consequences of offshore outsourcing-e.g., the possible increase in unemployment among IT professionals-does not concern the interviewees.
Offshore Outsourcing Motivations and Risks
THE TYPOLOGY OF FIRMS
The objective is to identify a typology of enterprises according to what they think the main motivations and risks associated with offshore outsourcing are. With this aim, we initially carried out a principal components factor analysis to summarise the information about outsourcing motivations. First, we verified the appropriateness of the analysis, as indicated in Table 7 , where the Correlation Matrix Determinant is close to zero, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin approaches one-although it is not one-and Bartlett's test of sphericity is significant. Determining the number of factors to extract is probably rather subjective in factor analysis (Hu, 2006) . The Kaiser's criterion, the percentage of variance explained and the scree plot test are all useful criteria to help determine the number of factors to extract. Kaiser's criterion suggested the need to extract a single factor (as there was only one eigenvalue above one-see Table 8 ). However, the eigenvalue for the second factor is 0.927, very close to 1. Therefore, we could also choose to extract two factors. What is more, the extraction of one factor only explains 49.068% of the variance of the original variables, and the scree plot test indicates that the extraction of two factors is suitable also (see Figure 1 in Appendix C). We consequently decided to extract two factors that account for 64.525% of the information about the original variables related to offshore outsourcing motivations (which is satisfactory, as it exceeds 50%). A Varimax rotation helped to improve the interpretation of the results, and Table 8 shows both factors and the initial items that form them (the information concerning the higher values is in bold for clarity). One item (more quality than in onshore outsourcing) makes a nearly identical contribution to both factors, so we excluded it in the interpretation of factors.
We can call Factor 1 Improvement Motivations. It groups together the factors that, as the unidimensional analysis above showed, are more relevant to offshore outsourcing (technical feasibility, improved cost/benefit ratio and greater flexibility as well as speed in projects). The motivations underlying this factor contribute more directly to the improvement of the IS services. This first factor is the most important, since it explains 37.161% of the variance. The second factor explains the remaining 27.363% and has less relevance, in keeping with the opinions of the interviewees (who assigned less importance to lower offshore outsourcing costs compared to onshore outsourcing and to access to international markets). We call this second factor Cost and Expansion motivations.
We next conducted a new principal components factor analysis of offshore outsourcing risks Table 9 reveals that this analysis was pertinent, too, as it examined the values of the Correlation Matrix Determinant near zero, the KMO index close to one, and a significant Bartlett's test of sphericity.
We followed Kaiser's method in extracting as many factors as eigenvalues above 1 exist, since there were precisely two eigenvalues above one which accounted for 69.892% of the information concerning the initial items (see also Figure 2 in relation to the scree plot-Appendix C). After extracting these two factors, we catalogued the first as cost-related and secondary problems because, as shown in the univariant analysis, these problems (e.g., hidden costs, difficulties with infrastructures or an increased national unemployment rate) seemed less important to the interviewees. Instead, the second factor summarises the information referring to the problems identified as the most relevant (those related to language, cultural, political, and legal issues, different time zones, and lower quality than in onshore outsourcing). We term these cultural and quality problems.
The four factors obtained for global outsourcing motivations and risks served as the basis for a cluster analysis to classify enterprises according to their views about those motivations and risks. We used two steps in the cluster analysis, following previous studies of cluster formulation in the IS area (Malhotra et al., 2005) . First, a hierarchical cluster technique decided the number of clusters to find, and, second, a non-hierarchical cluster method helped us define those clusters. During the first stage, we standardised the aggregate scores for each of the constructs, squared Euclidean distances acted as a similarity measure, and Ward's minimum variance method was useful at cluster formation. We studied the dendogram 5 produced by the Ward method and the agglomeration coefficient and we saw the biggest percentage coefficient change with two clusters, concluding that the use of two clusters was pertinent (Table 11) .
Afterwards, we carried out a non-hierarchical conglomerate analysis with the K-means method to generate two clusters, with the four factors mentioned above (motivations and risks), validating the result with the ANOVA analysis. We confirmed that the analysis was pertinent because all the variables were significant (see Table 12 ).
The two resulting clusters had 85 and 83 cases respectively. We interpreted each one of them next, determining how they differ. Table 13 offers the equality of means test of the groups.
The first cluster includes enterprises that can be described as realistic about offshore outsourcing, which includes firms that assign more importance to the motivations that contribute most to the improved IS services, namely technical feasibility; flexibility and speed; and an improved cost/benefit ratio. This cluster does not assign the same importance to cost and expansion motivations. Firms in this cluster consider all risk factors in general very relevant and are more aware of them than those firms in Cluster 2.
Enterprises in the second cluster do not attach so much significance to outsourcing risks and, instead, pay more attention to cost and expansion motivations. We call these firms 'optimistic though disinformed' because they cannot see the risks but value the motivations which, as the univariant study demonstrates, are not the most important element.
The first cluster is the most populous, though only slightly more than the second. We can thus state that the interviewed firms have a realistic attitude toward international outsourcing, are aware of its risks, and understand its main advantages. The number of firms in the second cluster suggests that many of the largest Spanish firms are still unaware of the risks associated with offshore outsourcing, perhaps because they do not practise it. Their only concern is the secondary or less important advantages of lower cost and access to international markets.
The next step was to verify the potential identification of the clusters obtained with certain characteristics of the enterprises that could act as control variables; i.e. size (by sales volume and number of workers), sector, and IS department size (in terms of staff and budget percentage allocated). Unfortunately, we could not find any statistically significant relationship between the clusters and these variables; however, we did find a very interesting link between the clusters and the adoption (or non-adoption) of offshore outsourcing (Table 14) . The firms that engage in more offshore outsourcing are predominantly in cluster one (realistic about offshore outsourcing), while firms doing less offshore outsourcing more often belong to the second cluster (optimistic though disinformed).
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Despite the rise of offshore outsourcing, Spanish enterprises show some delay in adopting this practice, not a surprising result since it confirms conclusions drawn from previous studies (Doldan, Luna, Martínez, & Piñeiro, 2006) . Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2002) showed that IS outsourcing is more mature in the United States than in Europe. Waarts and Van Everdinge (2005) confirm that, within Europe, the Nordic countries are more responsive to innovation than the Mediterranean ones (including Spain), which are more likely to avoid uncertainty. Since outsourcing can be considered an innovation (Hoecht & Trott, 2006 ), Spain's low offshore outsourcing level is consistent. This article has explored the validity of both the risks and the motivations of offshore outsourcing through the interviewed firms. All the interviewees supported the motivations, except for the 'higher quality of international outsourcing' reason. The questions on risk have mostly ranked as very or relatively important with the exception of the 'increased national unemployment rate' risk. Therefore, both managers and researchers should consider the motivations and risks discussed in later studies about offshore outsourcing theories and practice.
The most significant motivations to use offshore outsourcing include its technical feasibility, improved efficiency or cost/benefit ratio, and the greater flexibility and speed that this type of outsourcing affords. Supply clearly drives demand in this case and not the other way round, i.e., the existence of rapid, remote connections between customers and providers, even if distances are considerable, encourages offshore outsourcing. The advantages of lower costs are important, but not the prime factor behind the practice. This conclusion seems relevant since the advantage derived from lower salaries in countries such as India cannot be a sustainable long-term competitive advantage and, in fact, these offshore providers are looking for alternative strategies that can allow them to deliver services with higher quality levels and/or more added value (King, 2005) . Some data exist to confirm that, although the cost advantages of offshore outsourcing will continue to be important for quite a few years, their relevance is gradually starting to decline (Perelman, 2007) .
Among the most significant risks are language, cultural, political and legal problems, along with the different time zones and the potential hidden costs of offshore outsourcing. In short, the most relevant risks or problems linked to offshore outsourcing have to do with the human factor rather than with (1) Non-parametric Mann-Whitney's U-Test; and (2) Student's T-statistic.
technology. This supports the results obtained in other studies (KPMG, 2007) which conclude that only 12% of customers believe that offshore outsourcing problems only have to do with technology, while 60% of customers think that the problems stem from the 'human factor'. This research has identified two typologies of firms: realistic about offshore outsourcing or optimistic though disinformed. The former are good at identifying the main motivations to outsource, such as the improvement in IS services, and are equally aware of the risks. These firms engage in substantial offshore outsourcing and guide themselves by motivations, which initially do not appear as priorities in practice, such as 'access to international markets' and 'lower costs of offshore outsourcing'. Firms with low levels of offshore outsourcing do not pay much attention to offshore outsourcing risks in general. The first cluster is more numerous, which suggests that most of the interviewed firms are aware of both the main motivations and the main risks associated with offshore outsourcing.
We can establish some connections between the clusters obtained in this study and those identified by Carmel and Agarwal (2002) . Optimistic though disinformed firms do not practice offshore outsourcing to a large extent and are similar to the firms Carmel and Agarwal call offshore bystanders in their article. There are some differences, though. In our group, although many of the firms do not offshore and are unaware of the risks entailed, they still value the advantages of this strategy. Among our cluster managers, even those who do not practise offshore outsourcing see these options.
Similarly, even they are not exactly the same, we find resemblances between the cluster 'realistic about offshore outsourcing' and the group Carmel and Agarwal call proactive strategy focus. Our cluster includes the firms, which practise offshore more often and value the most important motivations, those with a strategic rather than a cost focus. The cluster also includes those firms showing a greater level of awareness about offshore outsourcing risks.
Consequently, after analysing the typology presented in our study, we can say that managers in the largest Spanish firms tend to recognise the importance of offshore outsourcing even when their organisations do not practise it and though this strategy is not common in Spain.
The bandwagon effect (Lacity & Hirschheim, 1993 ) is reaching offshore outsourcing practices, although the effect is slower in Spanish firms that in the rest of Europe and the US. Offshore outsourcing seems to be an unstoppable global phenomenon with an array of challenges to top executives and IS managers. The feasibility of IS offshore services give managers an opportunity to improve the IS services in their firms. Therefore, although economic motivations are relevant, managers should also take into account that they are not the first movers or the unique in their decision to offshore outsource. On the other side cultural problems, those related with behaviours, are restringing the generalization of offshore practice, especially in the Spanish firms. We think that it is necessary to invest in staff training and education (both on the client and on the supplier side) to overcome cultural barriers and other obstacles.
The present study is not without limitations, including a low response rate. However, we should recall that this ratio is similar to those obtained in others studies about IS outsourcing. Due to this response rate, it has been statistically impossible to analyse separately the answers of "domestic cases" (firms doing outsourcing only in their country) and "offshore cases" (firms doing offshore). Anyway, as we have stated before, the study is focused on studying "perceptions" of motivations and risks, we are analysing "opinions." So it is also interesting to know the opinions of firms not doing offshoring, and to verify that they are more identified with one of the clusters. The survey focuses on Spain, and results may not apply to other countries, but we think the study adds value because, to the best of our knowledge, there are few studies on the topic in Spain. The present study could represent an innovative contribution. Other limitations derive from the fact that the study 
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NOTES
1. We must mention the seminal article by Carmel and Agarwal (2002) , who researched into the offshore outsourcing driving factors and impediments.
2. Although some of the motivations and risks mentioned could have consequences at a macroeconomic or general level, our interest in them lies at an organisational level (i.e., the poor infrastructures of a country could prevent a potential client from offshoring to specific providers in that country; the growth of the unemployment rate in a "client" country could affect the morale and motivation of the IT staff of a client organisation operating in that country).
3. The collaboration provided by Mr. Juan Manuel Aparicio and Mr. Ramón Andarias deserves a special mention at this stage.
4. Test to show independence: firms which answered the survey and firms which did not.
5. Readers could apply for the dendogram graphic to the corresponding author. Percentage of the budget allocated to IS in relation to the organization's total budget: %
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